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SMALLWOOD v. STATE: MARYLAND'S HIGH COURT
REFUSES TO PERMIT THE FACT FINDER TO INFER A
SPECIFIC INTENT TO KILL FROM AIDS RAPE

I.

INTRODUCTION

Few would argue that one who attempts to wrongfully take the
life of another should not be punished. Nonetheless, this proposition becomes controversial when speaking of imposing criminal liability upon a defendant who attempts to transmit a deadly virus.
One of the most debated topics in criminal law today is whether
criminal liability for attempted murder should be imposed on
"AIDS rapists,"! HIV-positive 2 individuals who rape women while
fully aware of their own infected status and the consequences that
result from transmission. 3 The debate centers around whether a spe1. See gen(ffally Jennifer Grishkin, Casenote, Knowingly Exposing Anoth(ff to HIV, 106
YALE LJ. 1617, 1620 n.2 (1997) (using the tenn "AIDS rape" "to refer to a
rape in which the offender is HIV-positive or has AIDS"); Cathleen J. Schaffner, Note, Injfff'Ting the Intent of AIDS Rapist: Smallwood v. State, 14 T.M. CooLEY L. REv. 375, 375 n.l (1997) (using the tenn "AIDS rape" to refer to "one
who knowingly exposes another to the risk of HIV/ AIDS transmission through
the act of rape"); Stefanie S. Wepner, Note, The Death Penalty: A Solution to the
Problem of Intentional AIDS Transmission Through Rape, 26 J. MARsHALL L. REv.
941, 94344 n.15 (1993) (using the term "AIDS rape" to refer to an "intentional AIDS transmission through rape").
2. See gen(ffally Linda K Burdt & Robert S. Caldwell, Note, The Real Fatal Attraction: Civil and Criminal Liability for the Sexual Transmission of AIDS, 37 DRAKE L.
REv. 657, 657-64 (1988) (discussing the historical and medical background of
HIV and Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS».
3. See Kimberly A. Harris, Note, Death at First Bite: A Mens Reas Approach in Det(ffmining Criminal Liability for Intentional HN Transmission, 35 ARIz. L. REv. 237,
264 (1993) (advocating adoption of HIV-specific criminal statutes); Jacob A.
Heth, Note, Dangerous Liaisons: Criminalizing Conduct Related to HN Transmission, 29 WlLUAMETIE L. REv. 843, 866 (1993) (advocating adoption of HIVspecific criminal statutes). Indeed, three additional law review notes addressing Smallwood v. State were published while this Note was progressing through
the editorial phase. See gen(ffally Grishkin, supra note 1; Scott A. McCabe, Note,
Rejecting Inference of Intent to Murdfff for Knowingly Exposing Anoth(ff to a Risk of
HN Transmission, The Maryland Survey: 1995-1996, 56 MD. L. REv. 762 (1997);
Schaffner, supra note 1. Where appropriate, this Note attempts to summarize
and distinguish the positions taken in these three notes.
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cific intent to kill can be inferred from the AIDS rapist's actions. 4
In Smallwood v. State,5 the Court of Appeals of Maryland was
confronted with this controversial issue. Smallwood was diagnosed
with HIV in 1991.6 In 1992, a social worker informed him of the necessity of practicing safe sex to prevent transmission of the deadly
virus. 7 Despite these warnings, Smallwood raped three women on
three separate occasions in September 1993. 8 Smallwood did not
wear a condom during any of the attacks. 9 However, the Smallwood
court held that knowingly engaging in unprotected sex while infected with HIV does not, by itself, satisfY the intent to kill element
required for a finding of attempted murder.lO
This Note critically analyzes the Smallwood decision. Part II of
this Note provides a historical background of criminal liability for
HIV transmission. II It discusses the elements of attempt crimes, focusing in particular on the presumptions of intent that apply,12 the
concept of malice aforethought,13 and the defense of impossibility.14
Part II then compares the Court of Appeals of Maryland's decisions
involving HIV transmission and criminal liability with decisions from
other jurisdictions. 15 Part II also provides statistical data regarding
HIV transmission and AIDS in general. I6 Part III traces Smallwood
from the trial court through the court of appeals, discussing in detail the facts, holding, and rationale of the Smallwood court. 17 Part IV
analyzes the holding and rationale in Smallwood, arguing that the
opinion was wrongly decided for three reasons. 18 First, the Smallwood
4. See Heth, supra note 3, at 866; see also Harris, supra note 3, at 248; Rorie Sherman, Criminal Prosecutions on AIDS Growing, NAT'L LJ., Oct. 14, 1991, at 3.
5. 343 Md. 97, 680 A.2d 512 (1996).
6. See id. at 100, 680 A.2d at 513.
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See id. at 106, 680 A.2d at 516. The court of appeals held that Smallwood
lacked the specific intent to kill; therefore, the court reversed both the assault
with intent to murder and attempted murder convictions. See id. at 109, 680
A.2d at 518.
11. See discussion infra Part II.
12. See infra notes 45-51 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 52-59 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 60-67 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 68-131 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 13246 and accompanying text.
17. See discussion infra Part III.
18. See discussion infra Part IV. For an opposing view, see Grishkin, supra note 1,
at 1619 (arguing that the court of appeals reached the "only legally proper re-
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court incorrectly applied the standard for reviewing the trial court's
decision. 19 Second, this Note contends that even under the test
adopted by the Smallwood court-that specific intent cannot be inferred in cases where an infected person exposes another to HIV
unless there is additional evidence indicative of an intent to kill 20_
Smallwood's conviction should have been upheld because additional
evidence was present. 21 Specifically, Part IV explains why AIDS rape,
as opposed to mere exposure to HIV from consensual sex, provides
sufficient additional evidence indicative of an intent to kill. 22 Third,
this Note demonstrates that the court of appeals misconstrued the
precedent it relied on in reaching its conclusion. 23 Furthermore,
Part IV highlights an alternative approach to establishing the requisite mental state for attempted murder by AIDS rapists-permitting
malice aforethought to substitute for specific intent to killadopted by other jurisdictions, but rejected by Maryland courts. 24 Finally, Part IV concludes with a discussion of the future implications
of the Smallwood decision. 25
II.

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

A. Addressing Criminal Liability for HIV Transmission-Maryland Case
Law and Statutes

1.

Maryland Law Addressing HIV/ AIDS

In Faya v. Alvarez,26 the Court of Appeals of Maryland recognized the deadliness of HIV and its progression to AIDS.27 The
court noted that HIV is a retrovirus that attacks the human immune

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

27.

suit" by disallowing a finding of attempted murder). See also McCabe, supra
note 3, at 778-80 (noting the dangers inherent in criminalizing HIV transmission, particularly perinatal transmission).
See infra notes 213-36 and accompanying text.
See Smallwood v. State, 343 Md. 97, 106, 680 A.2d 512, 516 (1996).
See infra notes 266-99 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 237-65 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 300-29 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 23041 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 342-44 and accompanying text.
329 Md. 435, 439, 620 A.2d 327, 329 (1993). Faya was a negligence action
brought by two patients against Johns Hopkins Hospital and a surgeon who
was employed at the hospital. See id. at 44041, 620 A.2d at 329. The patients
brought suit against Johns Hopkins and the surgeon for not informing them
that the surgeon had AIDS. See id. The court held that the plaintiffs could recover under negligence principles for their fear of acquiring AIDS. See id. at
460, 620 A.2d at 339.
See id. at 439, 620 A.2d at 328.
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system, ultimately destroying the body's capacity to fight off various
diseases. 28 The court also recognized that "HIV typically spreads via
genital fluids or blood transmitted from one person to another
through sexual contact."29 Most importantly, the court took judicial
notice of the fact that AIDS is the final result of "an immune system
gravely impaired by HIV" and that most people who carry HIV will
eventually develop AiDS.30 Finally, the court emphasized that "AIDS
is invariably fatal. "31
In conjunction with judicial findings recognizing the deadliness
of HIV, the Maryland General Assembly has established that it is a
criminal offense for anyone to knowingly transfer or attempt to
transfer HIV.32 An individual who is convicted of violating this statute "is subject to a fine not exceeding $2500 or imprisonment not
exceeding 3 years or both. "33

2.

The Crime of Attempted Murder Under Maryland Law

The Maryland legislature has not adopted a statutory definition
of "attempt"; therefore, the elements of attempt are derived from
common law. 34 The common-law definition of "attempt" includes
two basic elements: (1) mens rea, a mental element requiring specific intent to be proven, and (2) the actus reus, requiring an act by
the defendant that encompasses a substantial step towards committing the underlying crime which goes beyond mere preparation. 35
Additionally, the fact that the defendant had the apparent ability to
commit the crime is encompassed within the actus reus requirement. 36 However, attempt crimes exist only in relation to other of28. See id.
29. [d. at 439, 620 A.2d at 329.

30. [d.
31. [d. at 440, 620 A.2d at 329.
32. See Mo.CoOE ANN., Health-General II § 18-601.1 (1997) (making the knowing
transfer or attempted transfer of HN a misdemeanor). Adoption of an HNspecific statute in Maryland and in at least 24 other states occurred in part because of conditions placed on federal grants for health care programs serving
HN-infected persons. See McCabe, supra note 3, at 777 n.106 (citing 42 U.S.C.
§§ 300ff-11, 300ff-47 (1994».
33. MO.CODE ANN., Health-GenerallI § 18-601.1 (1997).
34. See Selby v. State, 76 Md. App. 201, 211, 544 A.2d 14, 19 (1988) (quoting Cox
v. State, 311 Md. 326, 534 A.2d 1333 (1988».
35. See id.
36. See Warren v. State, 29 Md. App. 560, 572, 350 A.2d 173, 181 (1976) (quoting.
Wiggins v. State, 8 Md. App. 598, 604, 261 A.2d 503, 507 (1970».
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fensesY Accordingly, the defendant must be charged with an attempt to commit a specifically described crime. 38
In State v. Earp,39 the court of appeals held that the required intent for attempted murder is the specific intent to kil1. 40 Consequently, conduct that would support a conviction for depraved-heart
murder, felony murder, or murder with the intent to do grievous
bodily harm would not support a conviction for attempted murder
if the victim were to survive. 41 The only type of conduct that would
support an attempted murder conviction is an act done with the
specific intent to kill.42
The specific intent to kill may be proven by direct or circumstantial evidence. 43 Courts permit proof by circumstantial evidence
because the intent to kill is personal to the accused and generally
not able to be directly and objectively proven. 44

a.

Presumptions of Intent

Whenever circumstantial evidence is used to prove an element
of a crime, the fact finder must draw inferences in order to reach a
guilty verdict. 45 However, in all criminal cases, mandatory or conclusive inferences are unconstitutional. 46 In the case of attempted murder, if inferences are to be drawn by the fact finder, they must be
permissible inferences.47 Thus, the Court of Appeals of Maryland
37. See Selby, 76 Md. App. at 211, 544 A.2d at 19.
38. See id. at 211, 544 A.2d at 19-20.
39. 319 Md. 156, 571 A.2d 1227 (1990).
40. See id. at 167, 571 A.2d at 1233 ("[T]he specific intent to kill under circumstances that would not legally justify or excuse the killing or mitigate it to
manslaughter."). The required intent for assault with intent to murder is defined as a "specific intent to kill under circumstances such that if the victim
had died, the offense would be murder." Smallwood v. State, 343 Md. 97, 103,
680 A.2d 512, 515 (1996) (quoting State v. Jenkins, 307 Md. 501, 515, 515 A.2d
465, 472 (1986».
41. See Earp, 319 Md. at 165, 571 A.2d at 1232 (quoting WAYNE R LAFAVE & AUSTIN
W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAw § 59 (1972».
42. See id. at 165, 571 A.2d at 1232.
43. See SmaUwood, 343 Md. at 104, 680 A.2d at 515.
44. See id. (quoting Davis v. State, 204 Md. 44, 51, 102 A.2d 816,819 (1954».
45. See Dinkins v. State, 29 Md. App. 577, 579, 349 A.2d 676, 678-79 (1976); Evans
v. State, 28 Md. App. 640, 349 A.2d 300 (1975).
46. See Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 523 (1979) (holding that a conclusive
presumption conflicts with the presumption of innocence and invades the
fact-finding function of the jury).
47. See Kashansky v. State, 39 Md. App. 313, 320, 385 A.2d 811, 815 (1978)
(" [S] tatutes containing permissible inferences do not violate due process as
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has recognized that the intent to kill may be inferred from surrounding circumstances, such as "the accused's acts, conduct and
words."48
One common permissible inference provides that the fact
finder "is permi[tted] to infer that the [defendant] intends the natural and probable consequence of his or her act. "49 Thus, in certain
cases, the specific intent to murder has been rationally inferred by
the fact finder when the defendant used a deadly weapon which was
pointed "at a vital part of the human body."50 Nonetheless, in order
for the State's eVidence to support any criminal conviction, the essential elements of the crime charged must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 51

h.

Malice Aforethought

The crime of attempted murder generally requires proof that
the accused had the specific intent to kill. 52 Regarding HIV transmission, some jurisdictions hold that the specific intent to kill can
be satisfied by proving the defendant knew he was HIV-positive and
took some action evidencing an intent to transmit the virus. 53 In
rape cases, however, the act of rape alone is arguably insufficient to
show the specific intent to kill because the transmission of the virus
occurs simultaneously with the rape. 54 Nonetheless, the requisite intent to kill may be satisfied if the defendant is proven to have acted
with malice aforethought. 55

48.
49.
50.

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

long as the evidence necessary to invoke the inference is sufficient for a rational juror to find the inferred fact beyond a reasonable doubt.").
State v. Raines, 326 Md. 582, 591, 606 A.2d 265, 269 (1992) (citing Taylor v.
State, 238 Md. 424, 433, 209 A.2d 595, 600 (1965».
Ford v. State, 90 Md. App. 673, 686-87, 603 A.2d 883, 889 (1992).
Smallwood v. State, 343 Md. 97, 104, 680 A.2d 512, 515 (1996) (quoting Raines,
326 Md. at 591, 606 A.2d at 269). In Raines, the defendant fired a pistol at the
driver's side window of the victim's vehicle. See Raines, 326 Md. at 585, 606
A.2d at 266. The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that "Raines's actions in
directing the gun at the window, and therefore at the driver's head on the
other side of the window, permitted an inference that Raines shot the gun
with the intent to kill." [d. at 592-93, 606 A.2d at 270.
See Smallwood, 343 Md. at 104, 680 A.2d at 515 (quoting Wilson v. State, 319
Md. 530, 535, 573 A.2d 831,834 (1990».
See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
See Thomas Fitting, Note, Criminal Liability Jor Transmission oj AIDS: Some Evidentiary Problems, 10 CRIM. JUST. J. 69, 78 (1987).
See id.
See id. at 78 n.48.
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Malice aforethought may be established if the conduct of the
accused is "reckless and wanton, and a gross deviation from a reasonable standard of care . . . . "56 If the prosecution can prove that
the accused acted with malice aforethought, it can sufficiently establish the requisite intent for attempted murder, regardless of
whether specific intent has been provenY Thus, it is possible to establish criminal culpability without proving a defendant's specific intent. 58 However, Maryland does not permit this method of proving
malice aforethought in attempted murder cases. 59

c.

The Impossibility Defense to Attempted Murder

Legal impossibility is generally a defense to any attempt
crime. 60 That is, if it were impossible for a legal element of the
crime to exist based upon the facts before the court, the accused
could not be convicted of an attempt crime. 61 However, factual impossibility will not generally bar a defendant from being convicted
of an attempt crime. 62 Even when a statute calls for the present ability to commit the crime, a conviction may be sustained where the
intended crime was factually impossible to complete. 63
The rationale underlying the distinction between factual and legal impossibility is of particular relevance to any attempt crime. In
the case of legal impossibility, a court cannot impose punishment
56.
57.
58.
59.

60.

61.

62.
63.

Id. (quoting United States v. Black Elk, 579 F.2d 49, 51 (9th Cir. 1978».
See id. at 78 n.48.
See id. at 79-80.
See Abernathy v. State, 109 Md. App. 364, 371, 675 A.2d 115, 119 (1996) ("Although the depraved-heart state of mind may serve as an adequate mens n1a
for a conviction of consummated murder, it does not exist as an available
mens n1a to support a conviction for attempted murder.").
See Waters v. State, 2 Md. App. 216, 226, 234 A.2d 147, 153 (1967)
("[A]ttempting to do what is not a crime is not attempting to commit a
crime."). But cf. Lane v. State, 348 Md. 272, 285, 703 A.2d 180, 187 (1997)
(noting that the discussion of the legal impossibility defense by the Waters
court was dicta); Grill v. State, 337 Md. 91, 96, 651 A.2d 856, 858 (1996) (stating that the issue of whether legal impossibility is a defense to an attempt
crime has never been decided in Maryland).
See In re Appeal No. 568, 25 Md. App. 218, 221, 333 A.2d 649, 651 (1975)
(holding that factual impossibility is never a defense to an "attempt to commit
an intended crime"); Water.s, 2 Md. App. at 226, 234 A.2d at 153. See generally
WAYNE R LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTI, JR., CRIMINAL LAw § 6.3(a), at 510-18 (2d
ed. 1986) (discussing the voluminous amount of scholarly research on the impossibility defense).
See Water.s, 2 Md. App. at 226-27, 234 A.2d at 153.
See id.
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for a crime when elements of the crime do not exist under the facts
of the case.64 If this were permitted, the State would be absolved of
meeting its burden of proving all elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. However, regarding attempt crimes, a defense based
on factual impossibility will fail 65 because the focus is on the mental
state of the accused and the steps the accused took towards accomplishing the object of that mental state. 66 Therefore, legal culpability
exists despite the accused's unreasonable belief that his acts could
accomplish his intended result. 67
B. Addressing Criminal Liability for HIV Transmission-Precedent From
Other Jurisdictions
In Scroggins v. State,68 the Court of Appeals of Georgia affirmed
an assault with intent to murder conviction 69 of an HIV-positive
defendant who sucked up excess spit and bit a police officer, laughing in reply to the police officer's question as to whether he had
AIDS.70 The Georgia intermediate appellate court stated that an intent to kill can be proven by direct or circumstantial evidence of
malice or a wanton and "reckless disregard of [another's] life
equivalent to an actual intention deliberately to kill [the victim]. "71
64. See Lane, 348 Md. at 285, 703 A.2d at 187 (acknowledging that the majority
view is that legal impossibility is a defense for attempt crimes); LAFAVE, supra

65.

66.
67.

68.
69.
70.
71.

note 41, § 6.3(a), at 514 ("[W]hat is not criminal may not be turned into a
crime after the fact by characterizing the [accused's] acts as an attempt.").
See In re Appeal, 25 Md. App. at 221,333 A.2d at 651; LAFAVE, supra note 41, §
6.3 (a), at 511 (" [F] actual impossibility, where the intended substantive crime
is impossible of accomplishment merely because of some physical impossibility
unknown to the defendant, is not a defense.").
See LAFAVE, supra note 41, § 6.3(a), at 513-14.
See Scroggins v. State, 401 S.E.2d 13, 18 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990) (quoting 22 CJ.S.
Criminal Law § 123 (1989».
401 S.E.2d 13 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990).
See id. at 23.
See id. at 15.
Id. at 19 (alteration in original) (quoting Johnson v. State, 17 S.E. 974, 975
(Ga. 1893». Unlike Georgia law, the required intent for attempted murder
under Maryland law only includes the specific intent to kill, not malice or
wanton disregard equivalent to an intent to kill. Compare id., with State v. Earp,
319 Md. 156, 167, 571 A.2d 1227, 1233 (1990), and Abernathy v. State, 109 Md.
App. 364, 371, 675 A.2d 115, 119 (1996) (holding that the depraved-heart state
of mind will not meet the mens rea requirement to support a conviction for
attempted murder). See generally Schaffner, supra note 1, at 394 (noting the
Smallwood court failed to address this jurisdictional difference when distinguishing Scroggins).
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The court held that an assault with intent to murder existed beyond
a reasonable doubt because of the defendant's act of deliberately
biting the officer with the knowledge that he was HIV-positive. 72
Based on the defendant's actions, the Scroggins court concluded .
that the jury could infer that either Scroggins believed he could
transmit the deadly virus through biting, or that he had no care
whatsoever whether he actually transmitted the virus to the officer. 73
The court reasoned that a jury could infer a malicious intent to
murder because Scroggins's assault was equal to a wanton and reckless disregard as to whether he might transmit HIV.74 Thus, the
Scroggins court concluded that the defendant's actions were so wanton and reckless that they could be equated to a specific intent to
kill. 75 The court highlighted that it is not necessary that the attempted crime be factually possible to complete. 76 Rather, the intent
to commit the crime itself renders an act or omission the crime of
attempt. 77
In 1992, two years after Scroggins, the Court of Appeals of Texas
faced a similar issue in Weeks v. State. 78 The defendant, who knew he
was HIV-positive, was convicted by a jury of attempted murder for
spitting on a prison guard. 79 On appeal, the court affirmed the verdict, holding that the evidence supported a finding that the defendant could have transmitted HIV by spitting in the prison guard's
face on two separate instances. 8o
In reaching this decision, the Weeks court first specified the elements of attempted murder.8l The court stated that to prove attempted murder, "it is sufficient to show that the accused had the
intent to cause the death of the complainant and that he committed an act, which amounted to more than mere preparation, that
could have caused the death of the complainant but failed to do
so. "82 Applied to this case, the court explained that the State had to
prove that the defendant intended to kill when he spat at the of72. See Scroggins, 401 S.E.2d at 19.
73. See id.
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. See id. at 18.
77. See id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting 22 CJ.S. Criminal Law § 123 (1989».
78. 834 S.W.2d 559 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992).
79. See id.
80. See id.
81. See id. at 561.
82. Id. (citing Flanagan v. State, 675 S.W.2d 734 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984».

260

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 27

ficer. 83 The court concluded that the State had met this burden by
proving that the defendant knew he was HIV-positive when he
spat. 84 Weeks's act went beyond "mere preparation, which tended,
but failed, to effect the commission of the offense intended, which
was the officer's death. "85
The Weeks court also relied on the Texas Penal Code to support
its decision. 86 The Texas Penal Code makes it a crime to intentionally
expose an individual to the AIDS virus. 87 Additionally, the Weeks
court relied on experts who testified that HIV transmission through
saliva was possible and that the disease could be transmitted by a
"one-shot deal."88 Although State and defense experts disagreed on
this point, the court concluded that "[ w] hile the evidence was
highly controverted, there is sufficient evidence . . . [that the
defendant] could have transmitted HIV by spitting. "89
Likewise, in State v. Smith,90 an HIV-positive defendant was convicted by a jury of attempted murder91 for biting a corrections officer. 92 Previously, the defendant had threatened to kill various corrections officers by biting and spitting on them. 93 In affirming the
jury verdict, the Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New
Jersey held that the defendant could be found guilty of attempted
murder upon a showing that the defendant intended to kill by biting. 94 The court noted that the defendant could be found guilty regardless of whether it was medically possible for the defendant's
bite to transmit HIV.95 Simply put, the court reasoned that it was
sufficient that the defendant believed he could cause death by bit83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

89.
90.
9l.

92.
93.
94.
95.

See id.
See id. at 562.
[d. at 561-62.
See id. at 56l.
See id. (citing TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.012 (West 1992».
[d. at 562-63. The Weeks court cited two experts: Mark E. Dowell, M.D., a doctor of infectious diseases at Baylor College of Medicine, and Paul Drummond
Cameron, Ph.D., Chairman of the Family Research Institute. See id. Both doctors were qualified as experts in the area of HIV transmission through saliva.
See id. at 562.
[d. at 565.
621 A.2d 493 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993).
See id. at 495. The defendant was also convicted of aggravated assault and terroristic threats. See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 493.
See id.
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ing and that he intended to do SO.96
In reaching this decision, the Smith court analyzed the New
Jersey attempted murder statute. 97 The trial judge found that the
defendant had violated subsection 2 of the statute. 98 Subsection 2
provides that a person is guilty of attempt to commit a crime if, acting with the requisite culpability required for the commission of the
crime, the person, "[w ]hen causing a particular result [which] is an
element of the crime, does or omits to do anything with the purpose of causing such result without further conduct on his part. "99
The trial judge explained that in order for the defendant to be
found guilty of attempted murder, he must have purposely intended to cause the death of his victim.loo The court explained that
this specific intent was a required element for the offense of attempted murder. 101
The defendant challenged the trial judge's description of attempted murder and the requisite elements, arguing that he was deprived of an inherent impossibility defense within the statute. 102
96. See id.
97. See id. at 501. The New Jersey statute governing criminal attempts provides:
a. Definition of attempt. A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a
crime if, acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required for
commission of the crime, he:
(1) Purposely engages in conduct which would constitute the crime if
the attendant circumstances were as a reasonable person would believe them to be;
(2) When causing a particular result is an element of the crime, does
or omits to do anything with the purpose of causing such result without further conduct on his part; or
(3) Purposely does or omits to do anything which, under the circumstances as a reasonable person would believe them to be, is an act or
omission constituting a substantial step in a course of conduct
planned to culminate in his commission of the crime.
N]. STAT. ANN. § 2C:5-1 (West 1995).
98. See Smith, 621 A.2d at 501-02.
99. [d. at 501.
100. See id. at 502 (citing State v. Rhett, 601 A.2d 689 (NJ. Sup. Ct. 1992».
101. See id.
102. See id. at 501-02. The defendant's impossibility defense was premised on expert
testimony explaining that HIV transmission through biting was " 'extremely remote' and 'very slim.' " [d. at 499-500. Therefore, the defendant reasoned that
because medical science finds it nearly impossible to transmit the virus
through biting, the trial court committed plain error in finding him guilty of
attempted murder under the statute. See id. at 50()'()2. The court rejected this
argument by holding that impossibility is not a defense to attempted murder.
See id. at 502. The court emphasized that under its criminal statutes, conduct
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Both the trial and appellate courts rejected the defendant's argument, concluding that "impossibility is not a defense to . . . attempted murder."103 Both courts acknowledged that the attempt
statute punishes conduct based on the defendant's state of mind,
not whether a particular result can be accomplished. I04 The appellate court emphasized that under subsection 2 of the attempt statute, "where the actor has done all that he believes necessary to cause
the particular result which is an element of the crime, he has committed an attempt." 105 In sum, the appellate court held that the statute's purpose was ,to criminalize the defendant's mental intent when
he participated in an activity which he knew would result in that
crime. 106 Thus, the probability or likelihood of the defendant infecting the officer was irrelevant. 107
In State v. Caine,108 the Court of Appeals of Louisiana affirmed a
jury conviction for attempted second degree murder. 109 The court
held that the defendant's actions, which consisted of telling a victim, "I'll give you AIDS," and then sticking the victim in the arm
with a needle that contained a syringe full of clear liquid, were sufficient to support the attempted second degree murder
conviction. 110
The Caine court first explained that guilt for an attempt crime
is bestowed upon "[a] ny person who, having a specific intent to
commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object." 111 The court
then examined statutory provisions which indicated that in crimes
of attempt, it is irrelevant whether the crime was actually accom-

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

111.

is punished based on the defendant's state of mind. See id. Thus, the court
surmised that purposeful actions are punished regardless of whether the attempted result could actually be accomplished. See id. Finally, the court specified that the Model Penal Code rejected the impossibility defense because " 'liability ... focus[es] upon the circumstances as the actor believes them to be
rather than as they actually exist.' " Id. (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.05
commentary at 490-91 (1985».
Id. at 502.
See id.
Id.
See id. at 505.
See id.
652 So. 2d 611 (La. Ct. App. 1995).
See id. at 617.
Id. at 613.
Id. at 615 ' (citing LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14.27(a) (West 1986».
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plished. 1I2 The court concluded that the crime of attempted murder
merely requires that the defendant posses the specific intent to
kill. 113
Applying the law to the facts in Caine, the court held that the
defendant's actions supported the finding that he possessed the specific intent to kill his victim.1I4 The court reasoned that the defendant had the requisite specific intent to kill because he purposely
stabbed the victim with a needle attached to a syringe full of clear
liquid. 115 Additionally, the court concluded that there was a strong
possibility that the needle was contaminated with HIV because the
defendant was HIV-positive, "TRACK MARKS" were apparent on
the defendant's arms, and the defendant had retrieved the needle
from his own coat pocket. 1I6 Furthermore, prior to the stabbing, the
defendant told the victim, "I'll give you AIDS."lI7 The court concluded, therefore, that the combination of all of the evidence
before it, coupled with a finding that the defendant possessed the
specific intent to kill, equaled a preparatory step towards the
defendant killing the victim. liS
In 1996, in State v. Hinkhouse,1I9 the Court of Appeals of Oregon
affirmed the conviction of an HIV-positive defendant for ten counts
of attempted murder and attempted assault.120 The Hinkhouse court
concluded that sufficient evidence supported the defendant's convictions. 121 First, the defendant was aware of his HIV-positive status
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

See id.
See id. at 616.
See id.
See id.
See id.
[d.
See id.
912 P.2d 921 (Or. Ct. App. 1996), modified, 915 P.2d 489 (Or. Ct. App.), cert. denied 925 P.2d 908 (Or. 1996). In Hinkhouse, the defendant repeatedly engaged
in unprotected sex while knowing he was HIV-positive. See id. at 922-23. Notwithstanding exhaustive warnings concerning the consequences of his actions,
the defendant would either deny his status to his partners when asked or fail
to inform them. See id. The defendant's unprotected sexual encounters were
so numerous that, as a condition of his probation violation, the defendant was
required to sign a probation agreement which contained a "commitment not
to engage in any unsupervised contact with women without express permission from his parole officer." [d. at 923. Despite this agreement, the defendant
continued to engage in unprotected sex. See id. at 922-23.
120. See id. at 922.
121. See id. at 924.
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and that his condition was terminal. 122 Second, he knew that this
condition could be transmitted through unprotected sex and that
transmission would eventually kill the transferee. 123 Finally, despite
his knowledge, the defendant engaged in persistent unprotected sex
with multiple partners, concealing his HIV-positive status from
them. 124
The court reiterated that when a person unjustifiably attempts
to kill another human being, that person has committed the offense
of attempted murder. 125 The court further defined "intentionally" as
"act[ing] with a conscious objective to cause the result or to engage
in the conduct so described."126
The Hinkhouse court concluded that the defendant's acts satisfied the required elements of attempted murder.127 The court reasoned that the defendant was aware of his status and was counseled
concerning the deadliness of the disease. 128 Specifically, the defendant was fully aware that a single encounter could transmit the virus
and that he should wear a condom during sex to reduce the likelihood of transmission. 129 Nevertheless, the defendant pursued multiple partners, continuing to engage in unprotected sex with women
while concealing his HIV-positive status. l3O Based on this evidence,
the court affirmed the convictions and concluded that the defendant's conduct would allow "a rational fact finder [to] conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that [the] defendant acted ... deliberately
to cause his victims serious bodily injury and death."131
C.

Statistical Data on AIDS and HIV Transmission

Statistical studies documenting the magnitude and continuous
spread of AIDS in the United States illustrate the fatal nature of the
disease and support efforts to impose criminal liability for intentionally transmitting the virus. In the United States, 501,310 cases of
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

See id.
See id. at 924-25.
See id. at 922, 925.
See id. at 924 (citing OR. REv. STAT. §§ 163.115, .005 (1995».
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting OR. REv. STAT. § 161.085(7) (1995».
See id. at 922, 925.
See id. at 922-23.
See id. at 922-23, 925. The defendant acknowledged that he was informed that
engaging in unprotected sex and transmitting the disease was equivalent to
murder. See id. at 925.
130. See id. at 923, 925.
131. Id.
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AIDS were reported as of October 31, 1995.132 Sixty-two percent of
those AIDS victims were reported dead. 133 As of June 1996, the Centers for Disease Control estimated that 223,000 adolescents and
adults were living with AIDS in the United States. 134 The World
Health Organization estimates that 18 million adults have been infected with HIV worldwide.135 Of the 501,310 nationally reported
AIDS cases, forty-nine percent of those occurred between October
1993 and October 1995. 136
In 1993, HIV infection was the most common cause of death
for persons aged twenty-five to forty-four. 137 In 1994, approximately
41,930 United States residents died as a result of HIV infection,
which represents a nine percent increase from 1993.138 Mortality
data for 1993 and 1994 show a continuing increase in HIV infection
as one of the leading causes of death in the United States. 139 Furthermore, from January 1996 to December 1996, 36,434 known
AIDS cases were reported. 140 Of these cases, 25,410 deaths occurred
during this same reporting period. 141 Finally, studies underscore the
fact that the AIDS epidemic is increasing most rapidly· among per132. See First 500,000 AIDS cases-United States, 44 CDC MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY
WKLY. REp. 849, 850 (1995) [hereinafter AIDS Cases]. As of December 1996, the
Centers for Disease Control reported that AIDS cases totaled 15,037 in Maryland. See U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, 8 HIV/AIDS SURVEILlANCE REn. 7 tbl.1 (1996) [hereinafter SURVEILLANCE REPT.]. The number of
AIDS cases in Washington, D.C., totaled 9,272. See id.
133. See AIDS Cases, supra note 132, at 850.
134. See SURVEILLANCE REPT., supra note 132, at 2. The report concludes that there
was a "substantial increase in AIDS prevalence in the United States." Id. Furthermore, the report states that these figures represent a 65% increase since
January 1993. See id. This increase illustrates a decline in AIDS deaths, but a
stable number of new AIDS cases. See id.
135. See AIDS cases, supra note 132, at 851.
136. See id. at 849.
137. See Update: Mortality Attributable to HIV Infection Among Persons Aged 25-44 YearsUnited States, 1994, 45 CDC MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WKLY. REp. 121, 121
(1996) [hereinafter Update]. HIV infection accounted for 19% of all deaths in
this age group, making it the leading cause of death for persons aged 2544.
See id.
138. See id.
139. See id.
140. See SURVEILLANCE REPT., supra note 132, at 19 tb1.13.
141. See id. These figures equate to a 70% death rate of those reported AIDS cases
during this particular reporting interval. See id. at 19 n.1. These figures include both adults and adolescents. See id. at 19. Furthermore, the fatality rates
reported may be underestimated because of incomplete reporting of deaths.
See id. at 19 n.1.
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sons, particularly women, infected through heterosexual contact
with a partner infected with HIV.142 The majority of new AIDS cases
among women are a result of sex with an HIV-infected man. 143
There are no available studies that report the rate, or potential
rate, of HIV transmission for a victim of AIDS rape. l44 During a single encounter of unprotected, consensual sex, a female with an
HIV-infected male partner faces a .01 % to .02% chance of being infected with the viruS. 145 Moreover, sexual encounters that involve violent penetration, such as sodomy and rape, increase the likelihood
of transmission. 146 Therefore, while we cannot conclude from the
available data a particular rate of transmission from one act of AIDS
rape, we can deduce from the available statistics that the rate is
greater than .01 % to .02%.
III.
A.

THE INSTANT CASE
Facts

In Smallwood v. State,147 Dwight Ralph Smallwood pleaded guilty
to attempted first degree rape and robbery.148 Smallwood was convicted of assault with intent to murder, attempted murder, and reck142. See Update: AIDS Among Women-United States, 1994, 44 CDC MORBIDITY AND
MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 81, 83 (1995) [hereinafter AIDS Among Women]; see also
Heterosexually Acquired AIDS-United States, 1993, 43 CDC MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WKLY. REp. 155, 159 (1994) [hereinafter Heterosexually Acquired AIDS].
143. See Heterosexually Acquired AIDS, supra note 142, at 155-56. This conclusion was
demonstrated by the following figures: AIDS cases resulting from heterosexual
contact increased 130% compared to 1992. See id. Furthermore, 49.7% of
AIDS cases are a result of heterosexual contact with an HIV-infected individual. See id. at 156.
144. See Scroggins v. State, 401 S.E.2d 13, 19 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990) (noting "the unsettled state of the body of knowledge as to the transmission of the AIDS virus"); Kevin A. McGuire, Comment, AIDS and the Sexual Offender: The Epidemic
Now Poses New Threats to the Victim and the Criminal Justice System, 96 DICK. L.
REv. 95, 96 (1991) ("At the present, there are no statistics regarding the risks
of transmission of the HIV virus through sexual assault.").
145. See McGuire, supra note 144, at 97 (citing a 1:500 male to female rate of transmission); Larry Costin, The Politics of AIDS: Compulsory State Powers, Public
Health, and Civil Liberties, 49 OHIO ST. LJ. 1017, 1022 (1989) (citing a 1:1000
male to female rate of transmission).
146. See State v. Hinkhouse, 912 P.2d 921, 923-24 (Or. Ct. App. 1996). In Hinkhouse,
Dr. Beers, an expert, testified that a violent, traumatic sexual experience increases the likelihood of tissue tears. See id. These tears weaken the body's barriers to the virus. See id.
147. 343 Md. 97, 680 A.2d 512 (1996).
148. See id.
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less endangerment in the Circuit Court for Prince George's
County. 149
Smallwood was initially diagnosed as being infected with HIV
on August 29, 1991. 150 He was informed of his HIV status by September 25, 1991. 151 In early 1992, a social worker warned Smallwood
of the importance of practicing safe sex to avoid transmission of the
viruS.152 In July 1993, Smallwood assured medical personnel that he
only had one sex partner and that he always wore a condom during
intercourse. 153
On September 26, 1993, Smallwood and an accomplice robbed
and raped a woman at gunpoint. 154 The two men forced the woman
into a grove of trees and placed a gun to her head while they raped
her.155 On September 28, 1993, Smallwood was again involved in a
similar robbery and rape of a woman at gunpoint. 156 Finally, on September 30, 1993, Smallwood and an accomplice completed yet a
third robbery and rape at gunpoint. 157 Smallwood raped this woman
and forced her to perform fellatio on him.158 In all three incidents,
the women were threatened with death if they did not cooperate. 159
Furthermore, Smallwood sexually penetrated all three women without wearing a condom. l60
B.

The Court of Special Appeals s opinion

Following Smallwood's conviction in the circuit court, he was
sentenced to prison on an array of charges. 161 On appeal to the
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, the court affirmed
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

See id. at 101, 680 A.2d at 513-14.
See id. at 100, 680 A.2d at 513.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 101, 680 A.2d at 514. Smallwood was sentenced to life imprisonment
for the charge of attempted rape. See id. This sentence was to run concurrently with a 20-year sentence for robbery with a deadly weapon, a 30-year sentence for assault with intent to murder, and a 5-year sentence for the charge
of reckless endangerment. See id. In addition, the court assessed a concurrent
sentence of 30 years for each of the three charges of attempted second degree
murder. See id.
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Smallwood's convictions for attempted second degree murder and
assault with intent to murder. 162 For sentencing purposes, the court
merged the conviction for assault with intent to murder into the
conviction for attempted second degree murder and remanded the
case to the circuit court for re-sentencing. 163 The court acknowledged that the issue before it was one of first impression and noted
its reliance on cases from other jurisdictions for guidance. 164
The court of special appeals reiterated that the applicable standard in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence for a criminal conviction was " 'whether the record evidence could reasonably support
a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.' "165 Thus, the appropriate inquiry at the appellate level is "whether . . . any rational
trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt" after viewing all the evidence most
favorable to the prosecution. 166 Moreover, the court of special appeals noted that the trial court's verdict would not be set aside unless it was clearly erroneous. 167
The court began its discussion by outlining the elements of attempted second degree murder. First, the court of special appeals
noted the crime of attempt requires an " 'overt act ... that goes beyond mere preparation.' "168 The court went on to note that the
crime of attempted second degree murder requires the specific intent to kill,169 which may be inferred from surrounding circumstances. 170 Finally, the court quoted the Court of Appeals of Maryland in defining the element of specific intent as " 'the specific
intent to kill under circumstances that would not legally justify or

162. See Smallwood v. State, 106 Md. App. 1, 15, 661 A.2d 747, 754 (1995), rev'd by,

343 Md. 97, 680 A.2d 512 (1996).
163. See id. at 16, 661 A.2d at 754.

164. See id. at 6, 661 A.2d at 749.
165. Id. at 4-5, 661 A.2d at 749 (quoting State v. Raines, 326 Md. 582, 588-89, 606

A.2d 265, 268 (1992».
166. Id. at 5, 661 A.2d at 749 (emphasis omitted) (quoting }Wines, 326 Md. at 588-

89, 606 A.2d at 268).
167. See id. (citing }Wines, 326 Md. at 588-89, 606 A.2d at 268).
168. Id. at 6, 661 A.2d at 754 (quoting State v. Earp, 319 Md. 156, 162, 571 A.2d

1227, 1230 (1990».
169. See id. (quoting Earp, 319 Md. at 163, 571 A.2d at 1231).
170. See id. The court illustrated such an inference through the circumstances

which existed in State v. Jenkins, 307 Md. 501, 514, 515 A.2d 465,471 (1986)
(inferring specific intent to kill from the act of firing a gun while pointed at a
vital part of the human body).
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excuse the killing or mitigate it to manslaughter.' "171
Mter laying this foundation, the court of special appeals affirmed the trial court's verdict and concluded that Smallwood's act
of inserting his penis into the vaginas of the victims "constituted an
overt act in furtherance of the intent that went beyond mere preparation."I72 Smallwood conceded to this conclusion and admitted
that, by raping his victim, he "did something that went 'past that
mere tenuous, theoretical or specter of chance of transmitting the
disease.' "173 In light of all the evidence, the court of special appeals
concluded that the offense of attempted first degree rape satisfied
the elements required for a finding of attempted second degree
murder. 174
The court of special appeals found that the element of specific
intent was present and rejected Smallwood's argument that his attempt to rape was just that-an attempt to rape-and insufficient to
infer a specific intent to kill. 175 The court cited several pieces of evidence which permitted a rational fact finder to infer beyond a reasonable doubt that Smallwood possessed the specific intent to kill. 176
First, the court affirmed the trial court's finding that malice and the
intent to kill could be inferred from the following facts: Smallwood
knew that he was HIV-positive; he knew that HIV is deadly and can
be transmitted during unprotected sex; and he made statements to
medical personnel that he always used a condom when engaging in
intercourse. In Notwithstanding this wealth of knowledge, Smallwood
forcibly engaged in unprotected sex with three women.178
Considering all of the evidence, the court of special appeals determined that the trial court could have found that Smallwood possessed the specific intent to kill, and the court relied on a wellgrounded principle of criminal law which holds that" 'one intends
the natural and probable consequences of his act.' "179 The court
171. SmaUwood, 106 Md. App. at 6,661 A.2d at 749 (quoting Earp, 319 Md. at 167,
571 A.2d at 1231).
172. [d. at 10, 661 A.2d at 751.
173. [d.
174. [d.
175. See id.
176. See id. at 14-15, 661 A.2d at 753-54.
177. See id.
178. See supra notes 15().60 and accompanying text.
179. SmaUwood, 106 Md. App. at 15,661 A.2d at 754 (quoting Ford v. State, 330 Md.
682, 704, 625 A.2d 984, 994 (1993». In Ford, the defendant claimed that he
did not intend to hurt anyone when he threw rocks at the windshields of vehicles traveling on a highway. See Ford, 330 Md. at 690, 625 A.2d at 988. Rejecting
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concluded that the natural and probable consequence of
Smallwood's acts would be the transmission of HIV-the deadly AIDS
producing viruS. 180 Thus, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
affirmed the trial court's verdict regarding the conviction for attempted murder and assault with intent to murder. 181 The Court of
Appeals of Maryland then granted certiorari. 182

C.

s

The Court of Appeals Decision

The issue before the Court of Appeals of Maryland was whether
the trial court properly found that Smallwood possessed the specific
intent to kill required for his convictions of attempted second degree murder and assault with intent to murder.183 Smallwood contended that the trial court lacked sufficient evidence to prove that
he intended to kill his victims.184 He argued that having unprotected sex when he knew that he was HIV-positive was insufficient to
infer an intent to kill. 185 The State, however, urged that Smallwood's
HIV-positive status was analogous to the use of a deadly weapon in
the commission of a crime. 186 The State argued that "engaging in
unprotected sex when one is knowingly infected with HIV is
equivalent to firing a loaded firearm at that person."187
The court of appeals held that despite Smallwood's knowledge
of his HIV-positive status, that fact was not sufficient, by itself, to
prove that Smallwood had the specific intent to kill required to
prove attempted murder and assault with intent to murder. 188 Rejecting the State's argument, the court reasoned that before the

180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

the defendant's contention, the Ford court held: "It is a reasonable inference
that a 'natural and probable consequence' of throwing a large rock through
the windshield of a fast moving vehicle is permanent injury of various forms
to the vehicle's occupants." [d. at 704, 625 A.2d at 994. Drawing an analogy to
the Ford court's proposition, the court of special appeals in Smallwood concluded that the trial court could have reasonably found that a "natural and
probable consequence of an HIV-infected assailant attempting to rape his victim, without using a condom, would be the transmission of the deadly AIDS
virus." Smallwood, 106 Md. App. at 14-15, 661 A.2d at 753.
See Smallwood, 106 Md. App. at 14, 661 A.2d at 753.
See id. at 1, 15, 661 A.2d at 747, 754.
See Smallwood v. State, 342 Md. 97, 101,680 A.2d 512, 514 (1996).
See id. at 101·{)2, 680 A.2d at 514.
See id. at 102, 680 A.2d at 514.
See id.
See id.
[d.
See id. at 106, 680 A.2d at 516.
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State could infer that Smallwood's actions evidenced an intent to
kill, the State must first show that the natural and probable result of
the defendant's conduct would have been death to his victims. 189 In
concluding that the State failed to meet this burden,190 the court explained that although exposure to AIDS is "one natural and possible
consequence of exposing someone to a risk of HIV infection," it is
not as clear that death will be a probable result from a single exposure to the viruS. 191 Therefore, without sufficient probability that
death would result from a single exposure to the virus, the court
found that there was insufficient evidence to support an inference
that Smallwood intended to kill his victims. 192 The court added that
because there was insufficient evidence to prove that death would
be a probable result of the defendant exposing his victims to HIV,
the State's analogy to a deadly weapon was tenuous. 193
Additionally, the court of appeals rejected the State's position
on the grounds that no other evidence existed to infer an intent to
kill. 194 Specifically, the court stated, "[Smallwood's] actions fail to
provide evidence that he also had an intent to ki11."195 The court
charged that some form of additional evidence, such as specific
statements or actions by Smallwood, was necessary to allow the fact
finder to infer that Smallwood possessed the requisite intent to
kill. 196
To bolster this conclusion, the court relied on several cases
from other jurisdictions that involved similar issues. 197 The cases relied on by the court were those cited by the State-State v.
Hinkhouse,198 Weeks v. State,199 State v. Caine,2°O and Scroggins v. State. 20 1
See id. at 105-06, 680 A.2d at 516.
See id. at 106, 680 A.2d at 516.
Id.
See id.
See id. at 105-06, 680 A2d at 516.
See id.
Id. at 106, 680 A.2d at 516. The court explained that Smallwood's actions did
not illustrate an intent to kill. See id. Rather, Smallwood's actions demonstrated the intent to commit the crimes of rape and armed robbery, crimes
for which he had already pled guilty. See id.
196. See id. at 107, 680 A.2d at 516 (quoting Fitting, supra note 53, at 78). The
Smallwood court was the first court to espouse the "additional evidence" test.
The court adopted the test verbatim from a student-written article. See id. The
student-author cited no authority for this additional evidence test. See generally
Fitting, supra note 53.
197. See Smallwood, 343 Md. at 107-08, 680 A.2d at 516-17.
198. 912 P.2d 921 (Or. Ct. App. 1996).
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
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The Court of Appeals of Maryland contended that each of these
cases demonstrated the type of additional evidence that is necessary
to infer an intent to kill: 202 in Hinkhouse, the defendant concealed
his HIV-positive status from the numerous women with whom he
engaged in unprotected sex;203 in Caine, the defendant stabbed his
victim with a syringe containing clear liquid after stating "I'll give
you AIDS";204 in Weeks, the defendant knew he was HIV-positive 205
and said he was "going to take someone with him when he went"
before he spat in a prison guard's face;206 in Scroggins, the defendant
"sucked up excess spitum" and then bit a police officer while fully
aware of his own HIV-positive statuS. 207
Based on these cases, the court of appeals concluded that the
State failed to provide any additional evidence, outside of rape, that
would allow the fact finder to infer an intent to kill.208 In addition,
the court held that the State failed to meet its burden of proof because it did not provide evidence tending to prove that death was a
natural and probable result of the defendant's actions. 209 Specifically, the court stated that "the State has presented no evidence
from which it can reasonably be concluded that death by AIDS is a
probable result of Smallwood's actions to the same extent that death is
the probable result of firing a deadly weapon at a vital part of someone's body."210
IV.

ANALYSIS

The AIDS virus has presented society with a health catastrophe. 2lI Predictably, this catastrophe has made its way into courtrooms across the nation. In light of the magnitude of the AIDS epidemic, society as a whole must accept responsibility for hindering its
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

208.
209.
210.

211.

834 S.W.2d 559 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992).
652 So. 2d 611 (La. Ct. App. 1995).
401 S.E.2d 13 (Ga. App. 1990).
See Smallwood, 343 Md. at 107, 680 A.2d at 516.
See id. at 107, 680 A.2d at 516-17.
Id. at 107, 680 A.2d at 517.
See id.
Id. at 107-08, 680 A.2d at 517.
Id. at 108, 680 A.2d at 517. The defendant in Scroggins laughed when the police officer inquired whether he, the defendant, had AIDS. See Scroggins v.
State, 401 S.E.2d 13, 15 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990).
See Smallwood, 343 Md. at 109, 680 A.2d at 518.
See id. at 105-06, 680 A.2d at 516.
Id. at 106, 680 A.2d at 516 (emphasis added).
See supra notes 132-43 and accompanying text.
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proliferation. Courts are not exempt from this responsibility and
must hold those who knowingly expose others to the fatal disease
accountable for their actions. 212 Thus, the importance of the decision rendered by the Smallwood court and its effect on society cannot be overlooked.
A.

"Where the Court of Appeals Erred

After stating the appropriate standard of review of the trial
judge's decision to infer Smallwood's specific intent to kill, the
Court of Appeals of Maryland then erred in applying that standard.213 Had the appropriate standard of review been correctly applied to the facts before the Smallwood court, the convictions for attempted murder would have been upheld. 214 Moreover, although
the additional evidence requirement advanced by the court of appeals was unnecessary, it was satisfied nonetheless. 215 The circumstantial evidence present in Smallwood's agreed-upon statement of
facts should have satisfied any additional evidence the court of appeals sought. 216 Furthermore, the court of appeals inappropriately
212. This principle has been supported internationally. Specifically, the Legal
Working Party of the Intergovernmental Committee on AIDS was created to
review the complex legal issues resulting from the HIV/ AIDS epidemic. This
committee recognizes a twofold principle: (1) individuals have a personal responsibility to protect their own health; and (2) these same individuals owe a
duty to others to prevent the spread of HIV/ AIDS. See Simon H. Bronitt, Criminal Liability far the Transmission of HIV/AIDS, 16 CRIM. LJ. 85 (1992). The Committee contended that this two-part principle is consistent with the policy of
recognizing that criminal liability should be extended to those persons who
intentionally transmit HIV/ AIDS. See id. at 86. Simon Bronitt opined that
criminal liability for the transmission of HIV/ AIDS should be extended to
those individuals who knowingly transmit HIV/ AIDS and either intend for
transmission to occur or act recklessly regarding whether transmission occurs.
See id. at 90; cf. Wepner, supra note 1, at 943-44, 951 (advocating that those
who spread the AIDS virus through rape should receive the death penalty).
213. The Smallwood court correctly stated the proper standard of review when it explained that Smallwood's conviction could only be affirmed if the decision of
the fact finder was reasonable in light of the evidence before it. See Smallwood,
343 Md. at 104, 680 A.2d at 515. However, upon applying this standard, the
court erroneously altered it, requiring the State to prove that death is just as
likely to result from AIDS rape as it would be from "firing a deadly weapon at
a vital part of the human body" in order for the fact finder's qecision to be
reasonable. Id. at 106, 680 A.2d at 516.
214. See infra notes 232-65 and accompanying text.
215. See infra notes 266-99 and accompanying text.
216. The agreed-upon statement of facts demonstrated Smallwood's knowledge of
his HIV status, the extensive medical counseling that he received, and his de-
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relied on precedent that failed to support its holding. 217
B.

The Appropriate Standard of Review

Smallwood intended, as the court of appeals requires, "the natural and probable consequences" of his acts. 218 In order for the trial
court to allow the fact finder to infer a specific intent to kill, the
judge must be convinced that this permissible inference would be
reasonable in light of the surrounding circumstances and actions
taken by the defendant. 219 This does not mean that the element of
intent is reduced to a reasonableness standard. 220 It merely permits
the fact finder to infer a specific intent to kill when it would be reasonable under the facts of the case. 221 The inference is permissible
and may be drawn by the fact finder only if it would be rational to
infer that the fact was proven in light of all of the evidence advanced by the State. 222
When dealing with a permissible inference, if the State proves
the basic facts that give rise to the inference, then their burden of
production has been met.223 The fact finder is then instructed that
it may draw the permissible inference, but remains free to accept or
reject the inference .224 In Smallwood, the trial judge sat as both

217.
218.
219.

220.
221.
222.
223.

224.

liberate acts of ignoring the warnings regarding the deadliness of the virus by
raping three women without wearing a condom. See Smallwood, 106 Md. App.
at 34, 661 A.2d at 748.
See infra notes 300-31 and accompanying text.
Smallwood, 106 Md. App. at 14, 661 A.2d at 753; see also supra notes 189-193
and accompanying text.
See Smallwood, 343 Md. at 104, 680 A.2d at 515; see also County Court of Ulster
County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 157 (1979) (~Because this permissive presumption leaves the trier of fact free to credit or reject the inference and does not
shift the burden of proof, it affects the application of the 'beyond a reasonable doubt' standard only if, under the facts of the case, there is no rational
way the trier could make the connection permitted by the inference.");
LAFAVE. supra note 41, § 3.5(f), at 225 (distinguishing between the reasonableness requirement for permissive presumptions and mandatory presumptions).
See LAFAVE, supra note 41, § 3.5(f), at 225.
See id.
See Ulster County, 442 U.S. at 164.
See id. at 157; see also LYNN MCLAIN. MAR\LAND RULES OF EVIDENCE § 2.301.4(b)
(1994). "The federal rules [and the Maryland Rules] contain no rule on the
effect of 'presumptions' in criminal cases, (when helpful to the State they are
actually only permissible inferences) . . . . The governing questions ... are
constitutional ones and are amply treated in the case law." Id. § 2.301.4(a) ..
See Ulster County, 442 U.S. at 157.
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judge and fact finder. 225 The court of appeals reviewed whether the
underlying facts that were proven by the State supported an inference that Smallwood had the specific intent to kilJ.226
The standard for reviewing this decision is whether the trial
judge's conclusion to allow an inference of the specific intent to kill
was so clearly erroneous227 that "under the facts of the case, there is
no rational way the trier of fact could make the connection permitted by the inference."228 If this "rational connection" is absent, the
result is that the burden of proof regarding the inferred fact unconstitutionally shifts to the defendant. 229 Nonetheless, only where the
rational connection is missing has the court violated the defendant's
due process rights, and the decision should therefore be reversed. 230
The Smallwood court stated that it was reviewing whether the
trial court's decision to allow the fact finder to infer a specific intent to kill was reasonable in light of the facts before it. 231 However,
the Smallwood court altered the standard upon applying it to the
facts of the case.
1. The Court of Appeals Erred When Applying the Standard of
Review to the Trial Court's Decision

The court of appeals erred by requiring the State to prove that
AIDS rape is as probable to result in death as the act of "firing a
deadly weapon at a vital part of the human body. "232 While the State
225. See Smallwood v. State, 106 Md. App. 1, 5, 661 A.2d 747, 749 (1995).
226. See Smallwood v. State, 343 Md. 97, 101·02, 680 A.2d 512, 514 (1996).
227. See Smallwood, 106 Md. App. at 10, 661 A.2d at 751. The court of special appeals correctly applied this element of the standard of review stating, "[w]hen
reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, 'we look at the evidence of guilt
under the microscope of Maryland Rule [8-131] which permits us to set aside
the verdict of the court if it was clearly erroneous . . . .' " Id. (alteration in
original) (quoting Murray v. State, 35 Md. App. 612, 614, 371 A.2d 719, 721
(1977». Moreover, case law indicates a trial court's judgment should be afforded relatively greater deference on review. See id. (citing State v. Raines, 326
Md. 582, 589, 606 A.2d 265 (1992».
228. Ulster County, 442 U.S. at 157.
229. See id.
230. See id. at 160 n.17; Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979); Mullaney v.
Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 686-88 (1975).
231. See Smallwood, 343 Md. at 103, 680 A.2d at 515.
232. Id. at 106, 680 A.2d at 516; cf. McCabe, supra note 3, at 778-80. One commentator opined that the court of appeals's decision establishes a dangerous precedent because it could open the door to convicting mothers who transmit
HIV to their fetus upon birth of attempted murder. See id. Even though seroconversion rates are typically cited as quite high, this fear ignores the obvi-

276

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 27

may have analogized the two,m appellate courts must review trial
courts' decisions not in light of analogies advanced on appeal, but
by the standards announced by the legislature or the Supreme
Court. 234 In Smallwood, the proper standard was whether the three
acts of AIDS rape were rationally connected to the specific intent to
kill.235 That is, could a reasonable fact finder have concluded that
the AIDS rapes and their surrounding circumstances demonstrated
that the defendant possessed the specific intent to kill his victims. 236
This query should have been answered affirmatively.
2.

The Appropriate Standard of Review as Applied to Smallwood

In light of what is commonly understood about HIV, a reasonable person could conclude that when an individual commits three
separate acts of AIDS rape, that person intends to kill his victims by
infecting them with the deadly virus. The appropriate standard of
review is one of reasonableness; therefore, an appellate court
should not consider only medical statistics regarding the efficacy of
the means employed by the assailant to spread the virus.237 Instead,
the court should consider the common understanding of the efficacy of the means employed in conjunction with available medical
statisticS. 238

233.
234.
235.
236.
237.

238.

ous differences between one who makes the decision to have a child and one
who decides to rape another. See Gostin, supra note 145, at 1044 n.I44. It can
hardly be imagined that future courts would equate the two, and prosecution
for acts of giving birth are implausible. See id. ("Compare the relatively low
risk of sexual intercourse with the much more significant risk of an HIV-infected mother having a seropositive baby. Here the risk is approximately 50%
or greater. Yet, the criminal law would not establish a penalty on the mother
for conceiving and failing to abort.").
See Smallwood, 343 Md. at 102, 680 A.2d at 514.
See supra notes 219-23, 227-28 and accompanying text.
See Ulster County, 442 U.S. at 157.
See id.
See Schulz v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 350 U.S. 523, 526 (1956) ("Fact finding
does not require mathematical certainty. Jurors are supposed to reach their
conclusions on the basis of common sense, common understanding and fair
beliefs, grounded on evidence consisting of direct statements by witnesses or
proof of circumstances from which inferences can be fairly drawn.").
Cf Wills v. State, 329 Md. 370, 391, 620 A.2d 295, 305 (1993) (reversing a criminal conviction based upon a finding that reasonable jurors' common understanding of "substantial and grave" improperly altered the reasonable doubt
standard); Perion v. United Fruit Co., 226 Md. 591, 603, 174 A.2d 777, 784
(1961) (quoting Schulz, 350 U.S. at 526); Fabritz v. State, 30 Md. App. 1,3,351
A.2d 477, 478 (1976) (holding that in a conviction for child abuse, the jury
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Medical experts have no data regarding the transmISSIon rates
from a single act of AIDS rape. 239 In fact, medical experts have
reached different conclusions as to the probability of transmission
during single incidents of unprotected, consensual sex.240 The only
statistical evidence of transmission rates before the trial court was
the rate of heterosexual, unprotected, consensual sex.241 This statistical evidence placed the odds of transmission at 1:500. 242
Reasonable persons, without any statistics whatsoever, generally
know that the most prevalent mode of transmission of the AIDS virus is through unprotected sex. Society is constantly bombarded
with public service announcements to this effect. Certainly, the trial
judge was aware of this commonly known fact. 243 Moreover, a reasonable person could conclude that a violent act of rape substantially increases the likelihood of transmission. 244 In light of what reasonable persons understand about AIDS, the inference drawn by
the trial judge, that Smallwood intended to kill his victims, becomes
more convincing when considered in co~unction with the aggravating circumstantial evidence. 245
Due to the arguably spontaneous nature of rape, it may seem
reasonable to imagine a person not having the specific intent to kill
by committing a single act of AIDS rape. 246 However, this was not
the case with Smallwood. Smallwood raped three women on three
separate occasions. 247 It would certainly be reasonable to construe

239.
240.

241.
242.
243.
244.

245.
246.

247.

should consider the terms of the applicable statute as they are commonly understood).
See McGuire, supra note 144, at 96 ("At the present, there are no statistics regarding the risks of transmission of the HIV virus through sexual assault.").
Compare Gostin, supra note 145, at 1022 (citing research indicating a 1:1000
male-to-female transmission rate), with McGuire, supra note 144, at 97 (citing
research indicating a 1:500 male-to-female rate of transmission).
See McCabe, supra note 3, at 778 n.111 (citing Petitioners Brief, Smallwood (No.
122» .
See id.
See Smallwood v. State, 106 Md. App. 1, 10, 661 A.2d 747, 751 (1995) ("That
HIV can be transmitted through sexual contact is undisputed.").
See McGuire, supra note 144, at 97 (explaining how statistics demonstrate that
the acts of rape and sodomy increase the rate of transmission to an even
greater likelihood of transmission than 1:500).
See infra notes 24749 and accompanying text.
See Scroggins v. State, 401 S.E.2d 13, 18 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990) (noting the importance of spontaneity, the court stated that the defendant's act of
"suck[ing] up excess spitum before biting [a police officer was] evidence of a
deliberate, thinking act rather than purely spontaneous").
See Smallwood v. State, 343 Md. 97, 100, 680 A.2d 512, 513 (1996).
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these three separate acts as the result of a contemplated, deliberate
motive. 248
The fact finder may consider the surrounding circumstances of
the events when inferring the element of intent. 249 However, this
does not require the fact finder to view the events as if they took
place in isolation. Therefore, in light of both what reasonable persons commonly understand about the AIDS virus and Smallwood's
three separately occasioned, deliberate acts, it was reasonable for
the trial judge to conclude that Smallwood possessed the specific intent to kill his victims by exposing them to the AIDS virus.
3. Statistics Support a Finding That Death Would Be the Natural
and Probable Result of Smallwood's Actions
Even if the efficacy of the means employed are considered, expert opinions, statistics, and case law illustrate that a reasonable person could conclude that when an individual commits three separate
acts of AIDS rape, that person intends to kill his victims by infecting
them with the virus. Courts, legal authorities, scholars, and medical
experts all agree that HIV is the cause of AIDS and that AIDS is invariably fataI.250 In the United States, another individual becomes infected with HIV every thirteen minutes. 251 Moreover, studies have repeatedly shown that heterosexual contact is the leading cause of
HIV transmission. 252
Even though experts have not reached a consensus, data exists
which indicates that the potential rate of transmission accompanying one act of unprotected, consensual sex lies between 1: 1000 and
1:500.253 In viewing the trial court's decision in the light most
favorable to the State, the court of appeals in Smallwood must have
considered the 1:500 transmission rate that was advanced by the
State254 because this was the only data before the court that corre248. The trial judge agreed with this view and stated, "I believe that [Smallwood]
also had sufficient time to consider the consequences of his act." Smallwood,
106 Md. App. at 5, 661 A.2d at 749.
249. See id. at 6, 661 A.2d at 749.
250. See supra notes 26-33 and accompanying text; see also Scroggins, 401 S.E.2d at
20; State v. Caine, 652 So. 2d 611, 617 (La. Ct. App. 1995); supra notes 132-46
and accompanying text.
251. See Michael L. Closen, The Arkansas Criminal HIV Exposure Law: Statutory Issues,
Public Policy Concerns, and Constitutional Objections, 1993 ARK. L. NOTES 47, 47
(1993).
252. See supra notes 142-43 and accompanying text.
253. See supra notes 14446 and accompanying text.
254. See McCabe, supra note 3, at 778 n.lll (citing Petitioners Brief, Smallwood (No.
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sponded to some of the circumstances of Smallwood's acts. 255
To date, the medical community has not published any data regarding the rate of transmission for victims of AIDS rape. 256 This is
due in part to the delayed incubation period of the virus and medical sophistication regarding its immediate detection. 257 However, the
consensus in the expert community, which is accepted by courts, is
that rough, violent penetration increases the likelihood of transmission. 258 Whether the penetration is anal or vaginal, it often causes a
tearing of flesh accompanied by blood and genital fluid exchanges
that result in open wounds being directly exposed to the virus. 259
Rape is the epitome of violent sex.
However, medical science cannot yet quantify the increased risk
of transmission a person faces when they are victimized by an AIDS
rapist. 260 When medical experts can tell a court that death could result from AIDS rape, but cannot quantify the transmission rates, the
issue becomes one within the domain of the fact finder.261 In this
situation, medical experts are in no better position to draw conclusions than are average members of the community with all of the
122» .
255. Smallwood committed three acts of AIDS rape. See Smallwood v. State, 343
Md. 97, 100, 680 A.2d 512, 513 (1996). These acts included both heterosexual
conduct and unprotected sex. See id. Only these two elements match the available data on transmission rates. See supra notes 14446 and accompanying text.
Statistics also demonstrate that violent sexual encounters increase the risk of
HIV transmission. See supra note 146 and accompanying text. However, because the data regarding the increased risk of transmission as a result of violent sexual acts has not been quantified by experts, it must be deduced from
available statistics. See supra notes 144-46 and accompanying text.
256. See Scroggins v. State, 401 S.E.2d 13, 19 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990) (noting "the unsettled state of the body of knowledge as to the transmission of the AIDS virus" supported upholding the jury's verdict as reasonable).
257. See McGuire, supra note 144, at 97-98.
258. See State v. Hinkhouse, 912 P.2d 921, 923-24 (Or. Ct. App. 1996). In Hinkhouse,
Dr. Beers, an expert, testified that a violent, traumatic sexual experience increases the likelihood of tissue tears. See id. These tears weaken the body's barriers to the virus. See id.
259. See id.
260. See supra notes 14446 and accompanying text.
261. See Scroggins, 401 S.E.2d at 20 ("Where a medical expert under thorough examination, testifies to his knowledge of the subject and still cannot state one
way or another whether a particular instrumentality is "deadly," the jury in
considering all the circumstances, including the risk to the victim and to society, is at least as competent as the witness to determine whether it was an instrumentality likely to produce death.").
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available data before them. 262
Thus, not only is HIV deadly, but given the fatal nature of the
disease as illustrated by these statistics, HIV can certainly be the natural and probable result of unprotected sexual contact, thus resulting in death. 263 Regardless of whether the court of appeals considered the efficacy of the means employed or the common
understanding of the efficacy of these means, the issue was properly
before the fact finder. When the court of appeals held that the
State failed to meet its burden of proof,264 it was asking the State to
prove, through statistical data, that which is not yet available from
the medical research community.265 The trial judge made the
proper decision to allow the inference to be drawn, and his reasonable conclusion as trier of fact should have been upheld by the
court of appeals.
4. "Additional Evidence" Requirement Advanced by the Court of
Appeals Unnecessary, but Satisfied
Turning to the element of specific intent to kill required for attempted murder, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that there
was insufficient evidence to prove that Smallwood intended to kill
his victims.266 More specifically, the court held that Smallwood's
AIDS rapes failed to prove that he possessed the specific intent to
kill his victims. 267 The court required that the State demonstrate
some sort of "additional evidence," such as explicit statements illustrating Smallwood's intent, in order for a fact finder to infer
Smallwood's intent to kill. 268

a.

Source of Authority for the Additional Evidence Requirement

The court of appeals advanced a novel theory when it held that
the State must demonstrate additional evidence, apart from the acts
involved in an AIDS rape, in order to support an inference of the
262. See id.
263. The fatal nature of the virus satisfies the "natural and probable" death element that the court of appeals required the State to show in order to find
Smallwood guilty of attempted murder. See supra notes 189-93 and accompanying text.
264. See Smallwood v. State, 343 Md. 97, 105'{)6, 680 A.2d 512, 516 (1996).
265. See supra notes 14446 and accompanying text.
266. See Smallwood, 343 Md. at 106..07, 680 A.2d at 516.
267. See id.
268. See id. (quoting Fitting, supra note 53, at 78).
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specific intent to kill. 269 The court applied an "inverse merger of intent"270 rationale when it concluded that Smallwood's acts wholly
demonstrate an intent to rob and rape and, therefore, they preclude the possibility of having a simultaneous specific intent to
kill.271 This rationale has no statutory or case law support. 272 It was
merely a theory advanced by a law student from Western State University College of Law.273 Possibly, the court confused this theory
with that of the inference discussion advanced by the dissent in the
court of special appeals's decision in Smallwood.274
The court of special appeals's dissent in Smallwood discussed
Judge Cardozo's theory on competing inferences. 275 The competing
inference theory holds that if "two different, mutually exclusive
states of mind are inferable: the stronger, more reasonable inference" must be adopted over the weaker.276 However, the intent to
rape and rob a victim are not mutually exclusive of an intent to
269. See id. at 107, 680 A.2d at 516.
270. The tenn "inverse merger of intent" is used to explain, by analogy, one of the
legal theories adopted by the Smallwood court. The tenn "merger" is meant to
analogize to the common-law doctrine of merger, whereby a lesser included
offense merges into the more inclusive, greater offense when each charge is
based on the same acts. See generally Williams v. State, 323 Md. 312, 316-17,593
A.2d 671, 673-74 (1989). The tenns "inverse" and "intent" are used to describe the Smallwood court's conclusion that because the intent to rape and
rob fully describe Smallwood's acts, the intent of greater culpability, the specific intent to kill, cannot be proven by the same acts. See Smallwood, 343 Md.
at 107, 680 A.2d at 516 ("Smallwood's acti(;ms are wholly explained by an intent to commit rape and anned robbery .... For this reason, his actions fail
to provide evidence that he also had an intent to kill."). In' effect, the court
held that the more culpable intent (to kill a victim) will merge into the less
culpable intent (to rape and rob the victim) when the same act (AIDS rape)
is relied on to prove both states of mind. See generally id. at 107.Q8, 680 A.2d at
516 ("As one commentator noted, ... '[b]ecause virus transmission occurs simultaneously with the act of rape, that act alone would not provide evidence
of intent to transmit the virus.''' (alteration in original) (quoting Fitting,
supra note 53, at 78».
271. See Smallwood, 343 Md. at 106, 680 A.2d at 516.
272. See id. at 106.Q7, 680 A.2d at 516.
273. See id. (citing only one source for the "additional evidence" requirement); Fitting, supra note 53, at 78, 97 (explaining the additional evidence requirement
that arises as a result of the simultaneous intent to murder and rape). The
student-author cited no authority to support this proposition. See id. at 78.
274. See Smallwood v. State, 106 Md. App. 1, 19-23, 661 A.2d 747, 756-58 (1995)
(Bloom, J., dissenting).
275. See id. at 20, 661 A.2d at 756.
276. See id.
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kill.277 This theory would only be applicable to exclude a specific intent to kill when "depraved-heart" intent is more likely.278 There is
no reason that Smallwood could not have intended to rape his victims and simultaneously intended to kill them by infecting his victims with HIV. In fact, in a case cited by the court of appeals, the
defendant committed an attempted assault and an attempted murder and was held to simultaneously have the requisite intent for
both crimes. 279

b.

Rape Satisfied the ''Additional Evidence" Requirement

Case law supports a showing that, in addition to the general
dangers of transmitting HIV via consensual sex, Smallwood's acts of
AIDS rape greatly increased the likelihood of transmitting the
deadly virus to his victims.2so Courts have acknowledged that an unprotected, violent sexual encounter increases the risk of HIV transmission. 2s1 Smallwood raped three women.282 Not only is rape a traumatic experience, but it tends to be much rougher and forceful
than consensual sex. Thus, Smallwood's act of rape, which according to medical science increased the likelihood of HIV transmission,283 should satisfy the additional evidence sought by the court of
appeals to support a finding of attempted murder.284
c. Circumstantial Evidence Satisfied the "Additional Evidence"
Requirement

Specific intent can be proven by circumstantial evidence.285 A
fact finder could infer a specific intent to kill from the surrounding
277. See id. at 22, 661 A.2d at 758.
278. See id.
279. See State v. Hinkhouse, 912 P.2d 921, 922, 924 (Or. Ct. App. 1996) (upholding
convictions for 10 counts of attempted assault and 10 counts of attempted
murder).
280. See id. at 923-24. In Hinkhouse, Dr. Beers, an expert, testified that a violent,
traumatic sexual experience increases the likelihood of tissue tears that
weaken the body's barriers to the virus. See id.
281. See id.
282. See Smallwood v. State, 343 Md. 97, 100, 680 A.2d 512, 513 (1996).
283. See supra note 280 and accompanying text.
284. The Smallwood court apparently agreed with this proposition. See Smallwood,
343 Md. at 108-09 n.4, 680 A.2d at 517 n.4 (1996) ("An increased probability
of infection would strengthen the inferences that could be drawn from the
defendant's knowingly exposing his victim to the risk of infection.").
285. See id. at 104, 680 A.2d at 515.
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circumstances, including the "accused's acts, conduct and words. "286
In Smallwood, two separate arguments support a finding of specific
intent based on circumstantial evidence.
First, the facts and surrounding circumstances noted by the
State, but overlooked by the court of appeals, evidenced
Smallwood's specific intent to kill. This specific intent could be inferred from Smallwood's actions in light of his knowledge regarding
his HIV-positive status. Specifically, Smallwood was fully aware, prior
to and during the rapes, that he was HIV-positive. 287 Smallwood had
also received co~nseling from medical personnel regarding the fatal
nature of the virus and that the virus could be transmitted through
unprotected sex. 288 In addition, medical counselors informed
Smallwood that he must wear a condom when engaging in intercourse to reduce the risk of transmitting the fatal virus. 289
In sum, Smallwood was exhaustively informed about the nature,
methods of transmission, and consequences of the deadly virus. 290 In
response to these warnings, Smallwood acknowledged his understanding and assured counselors that he always used a condom during intercourse. 291 Notwithstanding Smallwood's wealth of knowledge about his condition and all of the above warnings, Smallwood
raped three women, on three separate occasions, without wearing a
condom.292 Based on this evidence, it was within the fact finder's
discretion to find, as the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
properly held, that Smallwood's acts and conduct evidenced a specific intent to kill as required for attempted second degree
murder.293
Coupled with the above, a second argument exists for holding
Smallwood criminally liable by inferring specific intent from his actions, conduct, or words. 294 The court of appeals has allowed this inference to be made when an individual uses a deadly weapon aimed
at a vital part of another person's body.295 However, the court re286. State v. Raines, 326 Md. 582, 591, 606 A.2d 265, 269 (1992) (citing Taylor v.
State, 238 Md. 424, 433, 209 A.2d 595, 600 (1965».
287. See supra notes 151-53 and accompanying text.
288. See supra notes 151-53 and accompanying text.
289. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
290. See supra notes 151-53 and accompanying text.
291. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
292. See supra note 154-60 and accompanying text.
293. See Smallwood v. State, 106 Md. App. 1, 14-15, 661 A.2d 747, 753-54 (1995).
294. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
295. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
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jected this same inference when the State analogized HIV to a
deadly weapon. 296 By erroneously requiring an equivalent likelihood
of death from the two acts, the court adopted a narrow approach
that ignores palpable similarities. Specifically, Smallwood's deadly
weapon is the virus itself-a virus thoroughly and extensively documented for its deadliness. 297 Indeed, other courts have reached similar conc1usions. 298 Thus, the latent force of the virus can be found
to be deadly when Smallwood, its carrier, immerses it into the
human body of another. 299 For the purpose of allowing the fact
finder to draw an inference of intent to kill, the virus can be
equated to a deadly weapon. Smallwood's use of this weapon against
another individual should give rise to a permissible inference of
specific intent to kill.
C.

The Court of Appeals Misconstrued the Precedent it Relied On

Turning first to the elements of attempt crimes, the court of
appeals has established that "[ t] he crime of attempt consists of a
specific intent to commit a particular offense coupled with some
overt act in furtherance of the intent that goes beyond mere preparation. "300 This definition does not require proof that the crime attempted actually be completed or be factually possible to complete. 301 Furthermore, the cases relied upon by the court of appeals
in support of its holding espouse the same understanding of this
definition.302
296. See Smallwood v. State, 343 Md. 97, 106·07, 680 A.2d 512, 516 (1996). The
State noted that Smallwood was aware that HIV ultimately results in death. See
id. at 105, 680 A.2d at 516. Furthermore, the State noted that Smallwood knew
he could transmit the virus to his victims through unprotected sex. See id.
Therefore, the State argued that one could infer Smallwood intended to kill
his victims. See id.
297. See supra notes 13243 and accompanying text.
298. See United States v. Schoolfield, 40 M.J. 132, 134 (1994) ("His aggravated assault is similar to that of pointing a loaded gun at a victim ... by analogy, because [the appellant] is HIV positive, the appellant'S gun is loaded and he assaults his victims by merely placing his penis in their vagina, whether or not
he ejaculates in them."); if. Scroggins v. State, 401 S.E.2d 13,20 (Ga. Ct. App.
1990) (holding that a jury could conclude that a bite from a person who was
HIV-positive was a deadly weapon).
299. See Schoolfield, 40 MJ. at 134.
300. State v. Earp, 319 Md. 156, 162, 571 A.2d 1227, 1230 (1990); see also supra
notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
301. See supra notes 62.fJ7 and accompanying text.
302. See supra notes 197-208 and accompanying text. These cases focused on the issue of impossibility of transmission and not on whether specific intent could
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The Precedent of Scroggins, Weeks, and Smith

In Scroggins, the defendant contended that his conVIctlOn was
unjust because rio proof existed which demonstrated that HIV
could be transmitted via human saliva. 303 However, the Georgia
Court of Appeals concluded that an attempt crime is determined by
the intent to commit the crime, not the likelihood of its success or
completion. 304 The court also explained that factual impossibility is
not a defense to attempted murder.305 The Scroggins court stated
that although the possibility of HIV transmission may be slight, it
did not preclude the defendant's conviction for assault with intent
to murder: 306 The court reasoned that" [s]o long as medical science
concedes this theoretical possibility," the jury was well within the evidence to consider the human bite of a person infected with HIV to
be "deadly."307 Thus, Scroggins's conviction was affirmed based on
his act of biting. 308
Parallel to Scroggins, the Weeks court refused to take judicial natice that it is impossible to spread HIV through spitting. 309 The expert testimony conflicted regarding this mode of transmission and,
thus, the court concluded that even though "[m] any of the AIDS
experts express the opinion that it is impossible to spread HIV
through saliva[;] ... this has not been conclusively established and
is not free from reasonable dispute."3IO
Similarly, the Smith court rejected impossibility as a defense to
attempted murder.311 The defendant argued that he could not be
found guilty of attempted murder because he knew "without dispute [that] a bite cannot transmit HIV .... "312 In rejecting this argument, the Smith court concluded that the issue of whether a bite
could transmit HIV was irrelevant. 3l3 The court reasoned that "our
be inferred.
303. See Scroggins, 401 S.E.2d at 16.
304. See id. at 18 (quoting 22 CJ.S. Criminal Law § 124 (1989»; see also OR REv.
STAT. § 161.405(1) (1995); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 15.01(a) (West 1992).
305. See Scroggins, 401 S.E.2d at 18.
306. See id. at 18-19.
307. See id. at 20.
308. See id. at 23.
309. See Weeks v. State, 834 S.W.2d 559, 562 n.2 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992).
310. [d.
311. See State v. Smith, 621 A.2d 943 (NJ. Super. 1993).
312. [d. at 495.
313. See id. at 496.
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criminal statutes punish conduct based on state of mind. "314 Thus,
the court held that purposeful actions will result in punishment, regardless of whether the result is accomplished. 315
In Scroggins, Weeks, and Smith, the courts affirmed convictions
for attempted murder based on less likely modes of transmissionbiting or saliva exchange-as compared to Smallwood's more recognized method of transmission: unprotected sex (in the form of
AIDS rape).316 Unlike the acts of Scroggins, Weeks, and Smith,
Smallwood's acts were more likely, and arguably certain, to have fatal results. The above holdings demonstrate that to establish the elements of attempted murder, courts allow for more liberal findings
of intent than the reluctance embodied in Smallwood.
The majority opinions in these jurisdictions espouse the principle that the act attempted does not have to result in the likelihood
of accomplishment. 317 Unlike the Court of Appeals of Maryland, the
courts referenced above do not require a showing that death would
have been as probable a result as would firing a gun at a person. 318
Nonetheless, the court of appeals relied upon them in support of
its holding. Had the Maryland Court of Appeals followed and applied the majority standards set forth in Scroggins, Weeks, and Smith,
Smallwood's conviction for attempted murder based on his three
acts of AIDS rape would have been upheld.
2.

The Proper Interpretation of Scroggins, Weeks, and Smith

The appropriate standard for attempted murder that can be
derived from the opinions in Scroggins, Weeks, and Smith merely requires that the defendant possess a "specific intent to commit a particular offense coupled with some overt act in furtherance of the intent that goes beyond mere preparation. "319 Applying this standard,
Smallwood's acts met the requirements of attempt crimes .
. Smallwood voluntarily and fully aware of his HIV-positive status
raped his victims without wearing a condom.320 Additionally,
Smallwood's concession that he was aware of the deadly consequences of his acts 321 constituted an overt act in furtherance of an
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.

Id.
See id.
See supra notes 303-15 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 300-16 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 300-16 and accompanying text.
Smallwood v. State, 106 Md. App. 1, 6, 661 A.2d 747, 749 (1995).
See Smallwood v. State, 343 Md. 97, 100, 680 A.2d 512, 513 (1996).
See Smallwood, 106 Md. App. at 10, 661 A.2d at 751.
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intent that goes beyond mere preparation.
Regardless of this reasoning and notwithstanding the fact that
the majority of courts addressing the issue have upheld attempted
murder convictions on less recognized modes of transmission, the
Court of Appeals of Maryland reversed the trial judge's decision
based on the improper inference ground. 322 The court of appeals
held that no reasonable fact finder could conclude that death
would be a natural and probable result of Smallwood's actions, thus
finding Smallwood not guilty of attempted murder.323
Based on the extensive counseling and warnings Smallwood received, coupled with the deadly nature of the virus, of which
Smallwood was cognizant, one could reasonably infer that
Smallwood intended death to be the consequence of his actions. 324
This conclusion was soundly supported by State v. Hinkhouse;325
nonetheless, the Smallwood court found Hinkhouse factually
distinguishable.
3.

Distinguishing Smallwood from Hinkhouse: a Formidable Task

The Hinkhouse court held that evidence showing Hinkhouse was
aware of his HIV-positive status, that HIV could be transmitted
through unprotected sex, and that he repeatedly engaged in unprotected sex with multiple partners while concealing or lying about
his fatal disease supported a finding that Hinkhouse possessed the
requisite intent to kill. 326 The Hinkhouse facts were analogous to the
facts in Smallwood. Smallwood was no less culpable than Hinkhouse,
yet Smallwood was found to lack the requisite intent to kill. 327
In both cases, the defendants were aware of their HIV-positive
status and that the deadly virus they carried could be transmitted
through unprotected sex.328 Furthermore, both defendants concealed their status from their partners and engaged in unprotected
sex while fully aware of the consequences that could result. 329 The
only distinguishing characteristic of these two cases is the fact that
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.

See Smallwood, 343 Md. at 109, 680 A.2d at 518.
See supra notes 209-10 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 13243, 152-53 and accompanying text.
912 P.2d 921 (Or. Ct. App. 1996). See generally supra notes 119-31 and accompanying text.
See Hinkhouse, 912 P.2d at 924-25 ..
See supra notes 208-10 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 128-30, 151-53 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 128-30, 153-60 and accompanying text.
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Hinkhouse engaged in consensual sex while Smallwood raped his
victims.
The Hinkhouse decision supports the conclusion that Smallwood
had the requisite intent to kill. Thus, it was reasonable for the trial
judge to conclude that Smallwood desired his victims to suffer the
slow, debilitating death he faced. Therefore, in ~he light most
favorable to the State, Smallwood's convictions for attempted murder should have been affirmed by the Court of Appeals of
Maryland.
D.

Alternative Approach: Malice Aforethought

The concept of malice aforethought embodies conduct that
can be characterized as reckless and wanton, evidencing a gross disregard for human life. 330 This type of conduct gives rise to malice. 331
Malice aforethought is a degree of intent.332 When malice is present,
it establishes sufficient intent to allow criminal liability for murder
to be found. 333
This reckless and wanton conduct that meets the malice element of intent is usually associated with depraved-heart murder.334
However, some states also allow this depraved-heart intent to establish malice aforethought in support of a conviction for attempted
murder.335 Therefore, criminal liability may be found without proving specific intent. 336 Applying this element to the actions of an
AIDS rapist, one can reasonably conclude that he acts with a wanton and reckless disregard for human safety, thus establishing malice aforethought, which satisfies the mens rea requirement for attempted murder in some jurisdictions. 337
In Scroggins, the Georgia Court of Appeals held that the defendant's deliberate act of biting an officer when the defendant knew he
was infected with the AIDS virus allowed the fact finder to infer a
malicious intent to murder due to the defendant's "wanton and
reckless disregard as to whether he might transfer the disease. "338
The court concluded that such a wanton and reckless disregard for
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.

See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
See Fitting, supra note 53, at 78 n.48.
See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
See LAFAVE, supra note 41, § 7.4, at 617.
See Scroggins v. State, 401 S.E.2d 13, 18-19 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990).
[d.
See, e.g., id.
See Scroggins, 401 S.E.2d at 18.
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another's life is equivalent to a specific intent to kill. 339 Smallwood's
acts are parallel to those of Scroggins-Smallwood recklessly and
without regard to another's life violently raped three women, fully
cognizant of his deadly condition and the consequences that could
result to his victims.340 Scroggins supports a finding that Smallwood's
actions equaled malice aforethought; thus, this concept would seem
to allow for imposing criminal liability on Smallwood. Unfortunately, however, Maryland courts have specifically rejected this reasoning and do not permit malice aforethought to support a conviction for attempted murder. 341
E.

Future Implications of Smallwood

The Smallwood court not only adopted a lenient, narrow approach to imposing criminal liability for attempted murder on AIDS
rapists, but the Smallwood opinion also does not provide guidance
for Maryland courts addressing future, related situations. For example, the court's reasoning does not provide guidance as to whether
a murder conviction would be upheld on showing that an AIDS
rape victim acquired HIV and died of AIDS. Before October 1,
1996, if the death of a victim did not result within one year, the
"year and a day" rule applicable to murder would prohibit a conviction under Maryland law. 342 The practical result of the year and a
day rule would be to effectively bar any conviction for murder as a
result of HIV transmission. 343 However, in the 1996 legislative session, the Maryland General Assembly abrogated the year and a day
rule, thus raising the possibility of a murder conviction based on
AIDS rape when an infected victim eventually dies of AIDS.344
The aftermath of Smallwood will be that AIDS rapists will usually
face only the additional charge of reckless endangerment. It is an
act of injustice when the court of appeals deems it appropriate not
See id.
See Smallwood v. State, 343 Md. 97, 109,680 A.2d 512,518 (1996).
See Abernathy v. State, 109 Md. App. 364, 375-76, 675 A.2d 115, 121 (1996).
See State v. Minister, 302 Md. 240, 241, 486 A.2d 1197, 1197 (1984) (declining
to abrogate the common-law "year and a day" rule); see also Lori A. David, The
Legal Ramifications in Criminal Law of Knowingly Transmitting AIDS, 19 L. &
PSYCHOL. REv. 259, 263 (1995).
343. This is due to the slow incubation period of the virus and its even slower effects on the immune system. See supra note 257 and accompanying text.
344. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 415 (1996). Despite this recent development, it is
unlikely to have a significant impact on prosecuting AIDS rapists for murder
when their. victims die from AIDS. Due to the delayed incubation period of
the virus, an AIDS rapist will rarely outlive his victim.
339.
340.
341.
342.
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to punish, beyond a mere conviction for reckless endangerment,
the carrier of a fatal virus for his heinous conduct. To be sure,
AIDS rape is more heinous than rape alone. It places the rape victim in reasonable fear of death-fear that can stay with the victim
until well after the traumatic attack has occurred.
V.

CONCLUSION

The central issue addressed in Smallwood v. State is whether a
specific intent to kill could be inferred from three acts of AIDS
rape. 345 The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that such evidence
was insufficient to infer an intent to kill. 346 This issue is of great importance in Maryland and throughout the nation. Considering the
deadliness of HIV and the fatality rate of AIDS victims, severe criminal liability should be imposed upon those who knowingly, without
regard or value to human life, expose rape victims to the fatal virus.
Punishment should not come in the form of reckless endangerment, but should be commensurate with the savage act of the AIDS
rapist, who is void of any value to. society and so seriously threatens
his victim's existence.
In addition, criminal liability is necessary in order to further
the public health and safety goals of the state. It is unjust that a
defendant who immediately takes another's life is held criminally liable for the resulting death, whereas a defendant who knowingly injects a deadly virus into another, in which death is quite possibly
the final result, is not held to a comparable level of culpability for
his actions. The narrow approach taken by the court of appeals is
inequitable because it allows criminals to escape any meaningful liability for their potentially lethal actions. Courtrooms are not exempt
from the battle to thwart the spread of AIDS. Therefore, Maryland
courts have a duty to impose criminal liability on AIDS rapists who
subject innocent victims to the risk of death. In a civilized society,
AIDS rapists must receive severe punishment. The court's decision
is problematic because its narrow application of the requirement of
specific intent for attempted murder makes it almost impossible to
impose criminal liability for AIDS rape.

Tamara Lynn Mabey

345. See Smallwood, 343 Md. at 99, 101-02, 680 A.2d at 513-14.
346. See id. at 109, 680 A.2d at 518.

